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RECENT CASES. '
ATTORNEYS-EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO FEEs-In an action for legal
services, the testimony of lawyers as experts on the value of their profes-
sional services was offered in evidence. Held: It was admissible to guide,
but not necessarily to control the Court. Hunt v. Hill, 70 So. 522 (La.
1916).
It is universally agreed that opinion evidence is admissible on the ques-
tion of the value of legal services. Sexton v. Bradley, Iio Ill. App. 495
(1903) ; Clark v. Ellsworth, 73 N. W. lO23 (Iowa 1898) ; Randall v. Packard,
36 N. E. 823 (N. Y. 1894). But such evidence is not binding on the jury.
Head v. Hargrave, lO5 U. S. 45 (188i); Morehead's Trustee v. Anderson,
100 S. W. 340 (Ky. 1907); Bodfish v. Fox, 23 Me. go (1843). Generally
only the testimony of members of the same bar is admissible. State ex rel.
First National Bank v. Flarsheim, I19 S. W. 17 (Mo. igog); Thompson v.
Boyle, 85 Pa. 477 (1877). In some states it is not necessary that the witness
be an attorney if he has special knowledge of the subject matter. McNeil
v. Davidson, 37 Ind. 336 (1871) ; Frye v. Estes, 52 Mo. App. I (1892). Also
an attorney may testify in his own behalf as to the value of his services.
Babbitt v. Bumpus, 41 N. W. 417 (Mich. 1889). But evidence of what another
attorney would consider a reasonable fee for himself for similar services
is not admissible. Latourette v. Miller, 135 Pac. 327 (Ore. 1913). The
principal case was decided without a jury and is an extension of the older
cases which held that such evidence was entirely immaterial. Succession of
Macarty, 3 La. Ann. 517 (1848).
BANKRUPTCY-UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMS-DIscRETIoN OF REFEREE-While
an appeal from a judgment entered against a bankrupt for breach of a
contract of marriage was pending, the plaintiff filed a claim in the bank-
ruptcy court. The appellate court of the state having reversed the judg-
ment on technical grounds and ordered a new trial, the referee, on petition
of the trustee, recommended that the claim be re-examined and liquidated
by a jury trial in the state court. Held: The court properly confirmed the
referee's order. In re Martin, 228 Fed. 184 (1915).
The court's interpretation of section 63b of the Bankruptcy Act, which
provides for the liquidation of claims "as it [the court] shall direct", is in
accord with the prevailing view. Under the power therein conferred it
has been held that ample authority exists to adopt any procedure appropriate
to the case, "whether it be submission to a jury on an issue framed, or pro-
duction of evidence before the referee, or some other method." In re
United Button Co., 14o Fed. 495 (19o6). In re Silverman Bros., ioI Fed.
219 (1899). It is also within the discretion of the court or referee where it
deems proper to permit the adjudication of the claim in the state courts.
In re Johnson, ii A. B. R. 544 (19o4) ; and it may likewise direct litigation
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to be instituted, or if already commenced, to be continued. Remington,
Bankruptcy, 2d Ed., Vol. I, Sec. 712 et seq.
In in re Fife, io9 Fed. 88o (i9oi), where a judgment for breach of prom-
ise of marriage was obtained after the petition had been filed but before
the consideration of the application for discharge, it was held provable under
section 63a5. It was contended on behalf of the bankrupt in the principal case
that until the referee upon evidence was satisfied of the existence and breach
of a contract of marriage there was no "unliquidated claim" within section
63b of which he could direct liquidation. The court held that the claim that
such contract existed of itself constituted a claim within that section of the
act.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-FOREIGN STATUTE OF LrMITATIONS-A fireman was
injured while working for the defendant in Louisiana. The Louisiana stat-
ute extinguished the right of action in one year. All of the parties resided
within the state of the forum since the date of the injury. Held: The Louisi-
ana statute did not apply to an action in the forum brought within the time
prescribed by the local statute. Smith v. Webb, 18i S. W. 814 (Tex. I916).
The general rule is that the remedies as distinguished from the rights
of the parties are determined by the law of the forum, and that the statutes
of limitation are a part of the remedies and not of the law affecting the
rights. Story, Confl. Laws, 576, 577 et seq.; Thomas v. Clarkson, 125 Ga.
72 (I9O6). But where the statute not merely denies a remedy after the
statutory period, but extinguishes the cause of action upon the period of
limitation, it seems that the same law will follow the liability into any other
jurisdiction. Story, Confl. Laws, 582; Perkins v. Guy, 55 Miss. 153 (877);
Lyman v.-Campbell, 34 Mo. App. 213 (I889). The principal case is appar-
ently contrary to this general exception in holding that the parties must
reside within the state where the cause of action occurred during the entire
length of the statutory period in order that such statute extinguishing the
right, should apply.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY OF OBJECT-A financial newspaper owed consid-
erable money to the director of a land corporation. The latter agreed to
accept a smaller sum in payment of the debt, on the promise of the news-
paper not to publish any comment upon the land company or upon any
transaction in which it was directly or indirectly concerned. Held: The
contract was unenforcible. Neville v. Dominion of Canada News Com-
pany, Limited, I13 L. T. R. 979 (Eng. i916).
The rule is fundamental that a contract that is immoral, or in restraint
of trade, or conducive to fraud or a breach of a trust, or is injurious to the
public service, is void. Dexter v. McClellan, ii6 Ala. 37 (1897) ; Charleston
Natural Gas Co. v. Kanawha Natural Gas Co., 58 W. Va. 22 (I9o5); State
v. Windle, i56 Ind. 648 (igoi). But there is a large class of contracts
providing for the partial restraint of trade, which have been upheld. Wol-
verton v. Bruce, 89 S. W. IOi8 (Ind. 1905) ; especially where the promisor
owes no duty to perform the acts he has stipulated not to do. Wittenberg v.
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Mollyneaux, 6o Neb. 583 (igoo); Clemons v. Meadows, 29 Ky. Law. Rep.
61g (igo6). Rarely has a contract providing for the non-performance of
acts not prescribed by law been declared invalid. Booth v. Davis, 127' Fed.
875 (i9O4). A few cases, however, recognize a duty to the public apart
from a duty prescribed by law. The decision of the court in the principal
case can be justified upon the above ground, the duty of a financial news-
paper to disclose information to the public without reservation. In addition
all contracts affecting public and quasi-public institutions will be strictly
scrutinized by the courts. Enid Right of Way Company v. Tile, i5o Okl. 311
(9o5).
CONTRAcTs-NovATIoN-RELEASE OF ORIGINAL DERToR-The maker of
notes transferred the goods for which they were given to another, who
agreed to pay the notes and assume the maker's liability. The payee accepted
the substitution but no notes were made by the transferee, as had been
agreed. Held: There was no novation and the maker was still liable.
Klinkoosten v. Mundt, I56 N. W. 85 (S. Dak. i916).
In a novation there must be an agreement to substitute the new debtor
in place of the original debtor, and an agreement to release and discharge
the original debtor. Curry v. Whitmore, iio Mo. App. 204 (195); Clay
Lumber Co. v. Hart's Branch Coal Co., 174 Mich. 613 (1913); Osborne v.
West, io3 N. W. 1i8 (Ia. i9o5). The third person must be substituted as
the new debtor, with intent to release the original debtor. Carpy v. Dow-
dell, 131 Cal. 495 (i9oi) ; Dillard v. Dillard, 118 Ga. 97 (1903). As in the
principal case, simply for the transferee to assume to pay the notes is not
a novation, Kelso v. Flemming, io4 Ind. i8o (x88s) ; nor is the agreement
of the creditor to accept the note of a third person in payment by itself
a novation. Fausett v. Foreman, 58 Cal. 513 (i915). The creditor must
unconditionally release the original debtor and accept the new debtor in
his stead. Goetz Brewing Co. v. Waln, 92 Neb. 614 (1912). There must
be a mutual agreement. McNulty v. Cruff, 211 Mass. 489 (1912); Scharff
Distilling Co. v. Springfield Coal, etc., Co., i8o Mo. App. 497 (1914). The
assent of the creditor is essential to a novation by substitution of the
debtor. Gibbs v. Waring, i39 N. Y. S. 981 (1913); Detroit Service Co.
v. Schermack, i79 Mich. 266 (1914). But such assent of the parties may
be implied. Whitney v. Ins. Co., 127 Cal. 464 (i9oo). So also the release
of the original debtor may be established by implication. Dewitt v. Monjo,
6i N. Y. S. io46 (igoo); Michigan Stove Co. v. Walker, i5o Ia. 363 (1911).
The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority in holding
that a mere executory agreement to accept a new debtor is not sufficient
to constitute a novation. Fausett v. Foreman, supra.
CRIMINAL LAW-VERDICT-IMPEACHMENT-In support of a motion for a
new trial after a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, affidavits of two
jurors were offered to the effect that had they known that the crime of
involuntary manslaughter was a felony under the laws they would not have
agreed to a verdict of guilty. Held: This evidence was properly excluded.
People v. Sidwell, 154 Pac. 290 (Cal. 1915).
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This case is in accord with the general rule laid down in Vaise v.
Delaval, i T. R. ii (Eng. 1785), and since adhered to, that affidavits of
jurors are not admissible to impeach their verdict. Straker v. Graham, 4 M.
& W. 721 (Eng. 1839); Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. i5o (Pa. 1811); McDonald
v. Pless, 238 U. S. 264 (1915). Several American courts, however, con-
sidering the English rule more stringent than public policy demands, admit
such affidavits when the misconduct involves some overt act. Perry v.
Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); Harris v. State, 24 Neb. 8o3 (1888) ; but even
under the rule in these jurisdictions reasons like those in the principal case
which lie in the mind of the deponent and cannot be controverted are not
admitted. Wright v. Illinois Telegraph Co., 2o Ia. 195 (1866). By code or
statute in several states an exception- to the general rule is made in the
case of verdicts which are the result of chance. Col. Code. Civ. Pro., Sec.
657; Gaines v. White, I S. Dak. 434 (i8go). The principal case held that in
the instances provided for by statute alone, could such evidence be received.
Sec. 64 UNIV. OF PENNA. LAW REVIEW, 86.
DEEDS-DEEDS IN BLANK-PAROL POWER OF ATTORNEY-A vendor of lard
delivered to the vendee a deed without filling in the name of the grantee,
there being an understanding that the- vendee could fill in the name of any
subsequent purchaser as grantee. Held: This gave an irrevocable power to
fill in the blank directly to the first vendee, and by implication to subsequent
vendees, and when a name was filled in by one having such power the title
became vested in that person as grantee of the original vendor. Fennimore
v. Ingham, i81 S. W. 513 (Tex. I915).
It is a basic principle that a deed which does not contain the name of
the grantee is void. Allen v. Withrow, nio U. S. 119 (I884); Wunderlin v.
Cadogan, 5o Cal. 613 (1875); Mickey v. Barton, 194 Ill. 446 (1902). One
having proper authority may fill in this blank; and it is on this point that
courts do not agree. The strict rule is that the authority must equal the
instrument in dignity, and so must at least be in writing. Hibblewhite v.
McMorine, 6 M. & W. 200 (Eng. 1838); Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85 (1871);
Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen 305 (Mass. 1863). In the American courts, how-
ever, the tendency is to allow parol authority; in many instances probably
because of the abolishment of sealed instruments. 2 Jones, Real Property,
Sec. 1328 ff.; Drury v. Foster, 2 Wall. 24 (U. S. 1864) ; Swartz v. Ballou,
47 Ia. 188 (1871); Thummel v. Holden, 149 Mo. 677 (1899); Lafferty v.
Lafferty, 42 W. Va. 783 (I896). And in many states where parol authority
is sufficient, the mere delivery of the deed, in blank as to the grantee,
carries with it an implied authority to fill in. Creveling v. Barton, 138 Ia. 47
(i9o8) ; S. Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me. 89 (1865). See also on the filling)of
blanks, I Devlin, Deeds, Sec. 457.
EQUITY JURISDICTION-REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS-MISTAKE-A con-
tract for the sale of land failed to express the intention of the parties be-
cause of a mistaken conception of the law of another state. Held: The mis-
take as to the law of another state was a mistake of fact, and the contract
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was subject to reformation on the basis of parol evidence. Schlosser v.
Nicholson, III N. E. 13 (Ind. 1916).
One exception to the general rule that parol evidence will not be
admitted to vary the terms of a valid written instrument is found where
the instrument fails to express the intention of the parties because of a
mistake of fact. Gump's Appeal, 65 Pa. 476 (187o) ; Moynihan v. Brcnnan.
77 N. H. 273 (914). But the reformation will be allowed only at the
discretion of the court. Edmond's Appeal, 59 Pa. 220 (1868) ; Bank v. Hart-
man, 147 Pa. 558 (1892). And the mistake of fact must be mutual. Gough
v. Williamson, 62 N. J. Eq. 526 (igoi) ; Curtis v. Albee, 167 N. Y. 360 (igoi) ;
Light Co. v. Poor Dist., 21 Pa. Super. Ct. 95 (19o2); except under very
strong and extraordinary circumstances. Gaver v. Gaver, 119 .Id. 634
(1913) ; Forrester v. Moon, ioO S. C. 157 (914) ; or unless accompanied by
fraud. Barnum v. White, 128 Minn. 58 (914). The instrument will also
be reformed when the error is made by a scrivener or draftsman. Newland
v. Church Soc., 137 Mich. 335 (19o4); Baab v. Houser, 203 Pa. 470 (1902).
On the other hand a mere mistake of law without other circumstances
constitutes no ground for the reformation of written instruments. Ather-
ton v. Roche, 192 Ill. 252 (19O); Wemple v. Hauenstein, 46 N. Y. S. 288
(1897). However, when the agreement is what it was intended to be, and
a mistake of law is made in reducing the contract to writing, the instrument
may be reformed. Huss v. Morris, 63 Pa. 367 (1879); Myer v. Idlewood
Ass'n, 146 N. Y. S. 469 (1914). And as in the principal case when the
mistake is as to the law of another state, it will be treated as a mistake of
fact. Osincup v. Henthorn, 89 Kan. 58 (1913). This doctrine had its origin
in the case of Haven v. Poster, 9 Pick. 112 (Mass. 1829). See also Rosen-
baum v. Credit Co., 64 N. J. L. 34 (I899); Tyson v. Passmore, 2 Pa. 122
(1845); Bentley v. Whittemore, 18 N. J. Eq. 366 (1867).
EQUITY JURISDICTION-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH COMPENSATION-
COLLATERAL REPRESENTATION-In negotiations for the sale of land, reference
was made to the miles of fencing on the tract. It was not mentioned in the
contract of sale, but the purchaser claimed compensation for the misrepre-
sentation which was admittedly innocent. Held: The purchaser's right to
specific performance with compensation, arises only where there is a de-
ficiency in the subject matter mentioned in the contract, and not where the
deficiency is in a collateral representation. Rutherford v. Acton-Adams,
113 L. T. 931 (Eng. 1915).
This is in accord with the equitable doctrine of specific performance in
favor of a vendee, with compensation for a deficiency in the subject matter
of the contract. Pomeroy, Specific Performance, Sec. 438 ff.; Sugden,
Vender and Purchaser, p. 324 ff.; Townsend v. Vanderworker, 16o U. S. 171
(1895) ; Melick v. Cross, 62 N. J. Eq. 545 (19Ol). But where the vendor
can convey a relatively small part, it has been intimated in some cases, that
specific performance ought not to be granted to the vendee. Waterman,
Specific Performance, Sec. 2o6; Chicago Co. v. Durant, 44 Minn. 361 (i8go).
Where the vendor tries to enforce the contract, equity will often grant
specific performance even though there is a slight deficiency, awarding com-
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pensation to the vendee. Towner v. Ticknor, 112 Ill. 217 (1885) ; Smyth v.
Sturges, 1O8 N. Y. 495 (1888). When the deficiency is at all substantial,
however, equity will rarely act in favor of the vendor. Beck v. Bridgman,
40 Ark. 382 (1883).
EVIDENCE ADMISSIONS-ACTS AND DECLARATIONS OF CO-CONSPIRATORS-Jn
a prosecution for forgery the evidence tended to prove a conspiracy to
obtain certain real estate by a forged deed, the land or its proceeds to be
divided among the conspirators. Statements made by one conspirator after
the execution of the forged deed, but before the profits were divided, were
offered in evidence against a co-conspirator. Held: The evidence is admis-
sible, though the statements were made after the forgery. Grayson v.
State, 154 Pac. 334 (Okla. 1916).
The general rule is that admissions may be received in evidence only
against the party who makes them. People v. Gonzales, 136 Cal. 666 (19o2).
But where several persons are proved to have combined for the same unl.w-
ful purpose, anything said, written, or done by one of the party, in pur-
suance of the concerted plan, with reference to the crime charged, is deemed
to have been said, written or done by all, and is admissible against any and
all of the others who were engaged in the same conspiracy. Franklin Union
v. People, 220 Ill. 355 (i9o6) ; Knox v. State, 164 Ind. 226 (19o5). But the
competency of such evidence is determined by the fact that a conspiracy or
combination existed; hence a foundation must first be laid by other evidence,
sufficient in the opinion of the court to establish prima facie the fact of
conspiracy between the parties. People v. Seidenshner, 210 N. Y. 341 (1914) ;
Wallace v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. App. 318 (i9o5). The acts and declarations
sought to be admitted, however, must have occurred during the course of
the conspiracy; if occurring before the formation of the conspiracy or after
the accomplishment of its object they are inadmissible. State v. Myers, igs
Mo. 225 (i9o6) ; State v. Wells, 33 Mont. 291 (19o5) ; State v. Walker, 124
Ia. 414 (19o4). The mere fact that the crime has been committed does not
render subsequent acts and declarations inadmissible if they occur before
complete fulfillment of the common purpose. State v. Soper, ITS Ia. I
(1902). E. g., where the conspiracy is for the purpose of obtaining money
or property, the conspiracy is considered pending until the proceeds arc
divided. O'Brien v. State, 69 Neb. 691 (19o3) ; Com. v. Zuern, 16 Pa. Super.
588 (19Ol). The principal case is therefore in accord with the general rule.
Likewise, where it is part of a conspiracy to murder to conceal the evi-
dences of the crime after its commission, the conspiracy is deemed to con-
tinue until the concealment, and acts and declarations up to that time are
admissible against co-conspirators. Eggleston v. State, 59 Tex. Crim. 54-
(I910).
EVIDENCE-CONFESSION-QUESTION OF LAW OR FAcT-In the course .of a
criminal trial the question arose as to whether a confession sought to be
introduced by the prosecution had been made voluntarily. The court ad-
mitted the confession but directed the jury to reject it if, upon the whole
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evidence they were satisfied that it was not the voluntary act of the defendant.
Held: The court pursued the proper course. United States v. Oppenheim,
228 Fed. 232 (1916).
Upon the question raised by the principal case the decisions of the courts
are in conflict. In many jurisdictions the matter is entirely in the discretion
of the trial court, and only a clear abuse of that discretion constitutes a
ground for reversal. Travers v. U. S. 6 App. D. C. 45o (1895); Howard v.
Comm., 28 Ky. Law. Rep. 737 (9ol). In other jurisdictions the admissibility
of a confession is a matter to be determined by the jury. Milner v. State,
124 Ga. 86 (19o5). Some courts decide the question as a matter of law
before permitting the confession to be placed before the jury. State v.
Stibbens, 188 Mo. 387 (19o5); State v. Young, 68 N. J. L. 299 (19o2). A
large number however hold with the principal case and will decide the
question of the admission of a confession only if the evidence points clearly
in one direction; if the evidence is conflicting the confession will be sub-
mitted to the jury with instructions that they disregard it entirely if they
believe it involuntary. Comm. v. Antaya, 184 Mass. 326 (19o3); Roesel v.
State, 162 N. J. L. 216 (1898) ; State v. Storms, 113 Iowa 385 (19ol).
MASTER AND SERVANT-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT-CoMPARA-
TIVE NEGLIGENcE-A laborer, employed in repairing a track used in interstate
commerce, was injured, partly through his own negligence and partly through
the negligence of his employer. Held: Under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act he could recover such proportion of the total damage suffered as
the negligence attributable to the carrier bore to the negligence attributable
to both. Waina v. Pennsylvania Co., 251 Pa. 213 (1915).
The purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability Act is to abrogate
completely the common law rule, that an employee cannot recover for in-
juries if he has been guilty of contributory negligence and to substitute a
system of awarding damages based upon a comparison of the negligence of
the employer and employee respectively. Norfolk & Western Rwy. Co. v.
Earnest, 229 U. S. 114 (1912) ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
I (Ign1). Under the Act the defendant is free from liability only when
the plaintiff's act is the sole cause of the injury and when the defendant's
act is no part of the causation. Grand Trunk Rwy. Co. v. Lindsay, 233 U. S.
42 (1913). Under the comparative negligence theory the jury should deter-
mine the entire amount of damages sustained and then deduct therefrom a
reasonable amount for the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, such rea-
sonable amount being left for the determination of the jury. Seaboard Air
Line v. Tilghman, 237 U. S. 499 (1914). Nearly all of the states have re-
pudiated the doctrine Of comparative negligence.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY "ARIS-
ING OUT OF' THE EMPLOYMENT-"LARKING" BY FELLOw EmPLOYFE-As a
practical joke a workman held the nozzle of a compressed air hose to a
fellow workman's rectum, resulting in the rupture of his intestines. Held:
Compensation should be refused; the injury did not arise out of the employ-
ment. Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 156 N. W. 143 (Wis. 1916).
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The principal case illustrates an application of the rule generally fol-
lowed where the Compensation Act, like the English Act, contains a pro-
vision that the injury must "arise out of and in the course of the employ-
ment," or a similar provision. The rule briefly is that there must be a
causal connection between the employment and the injury and it must occur
while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform.
McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497 (1913). While the rule seems well settled,
considerable difficulty has been experienced in its application and the cases
are not at all harmonious. See 64 UNiv. OF PENNA. L. REV. io8, and 64 Id.
326. Cases analogous on the facts to the principal case have been rare. In
Knopp v. American Car & Foundry Co., i86 Ill. App. 6o5 (1914), recovery
was allowed where a workman was injured when removing a tin can placed
under a trip hammer by a bystander' for fun. In Hulley v. Moosbrugger,
87 N. J. L. wo3 (I915), compensation was allowed where a workman was
injured in dodging a playful attack by a fellow workman. On the other
hand in De Filippis v. Falkenberg, i55 N. Y. Supp. 761 (i915), an employee
was injured by the sportive act of another employee while both were in the
toilet room, and while it was admitted that the injury was by accident in
the course of the employment, compensation was refused on the ground
that it did not "arise out of" the employment.
In the principal case the court was no doubt justified in its decision. A
deeper consideration of the theory on which Workmen's Compensation Acts
are based might have led to a different conclusion.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMIPENSATION ACT-INJURY "IN THE
COURSE OF THE EmPLOYMENT"'-NECESSARY ACTS OF PERSONAL MINISTRATION
-On account of the unsatisfactory water supply in the place of employment,
workmen were accustomed to use water taken from a nearby well in bottles
and buckets. The deceased drank from a bottle which he thought contained
water, but which in fact contained a poisonous liquid used in the work.
Held: The injury arose in the course of the employment and resulted there-
from. Archibald v. Ott, 87 S. E. 9/1I (W. Va. i916).
The rule of the principal case that acts of personal ministration by a
workman which are reasonably necessary to his health and- comfort while at
work are acts done in the service of the master, and hence that injuries
resulting from such acts "arise out of and in the course of the employment,"
seems to be the prevailing opinion. There is the necessary causal connection
between the injury and the employment demanded by the cases construing
that clause, although the act from which the injury arises is a more remote
and indirect act of service than usually appears. See cases and annotations
cited under Federal Rubber Co. v. Havolic. annotated in this issue, page 637.
The few decisions on the question are all in accord. Compensation has been
allowed where a workman was injured going down stairs from the work-
shop, on his way to lunch, Sundine's Case, 218 Mass. i (1914); where an
employee crossing a street to get to a toilet was run down by an automobile,
Zabriskie v. Erie R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 157 (ipr3) ; where an employee con-
tracted typhoid fever from drinking impure water in the shop, Vennen v.
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Lumber Co., 154 N. W. 641 (Wis. 1915); and even where a drayman on his
rounds stopped in at a public house for a drink and remained about two
minutes and while going back to his team was run down by a motor car,
Martin v. Lovibond, 7 B. W. C. C. 243 (Eng. 1914).
MASTER AND SERVANT-WRONGFUL DISCHARGE-BASEBALL MANAGER-The
manager of a baseball team sued for breach of contract of employment; and
the baseball company defended on the ground that he had violated a term
of the contract to perform his duty faithfully, by instructing the third base-
man to play back in order to help the manager's favorite, in the contest for
batting honors. Held: It was a question of fact for the jury whether the
manager acted as charged, and if so, whether it was a violation of his duty
under the contract and tended to the employer's injury, thereby giving the
employer cause for discharging him. O'Connor v. St. Louis American League
Baseball Co., I81 S. W. 1167 (Mo. I916).
This is in accord with the general doctrine that a discharge is warranted
by any act prejudicial or likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the master.
Pearce v. Foster, 17 Q. B. D. 536 (Eng. 1887) ; Vinson v. Kelly, 99 Ga. 270
(1896). It is unnecessary that actual loss shall have occurred. Deane v.
Cutler, 2o N. Y. S. 617 (1892). But if the contract is for a definite time,
there must be a good cause to relieve the master of liability for the discharge.
Jones v. Graham, 51 Mich. 539 (1883); Beggs v. Fowler, 82 Mo. 599 (1884).
At the time of discharge it is not necessary for the master to state the cause
on which he may later rely. Ridgway v. The Market Co., 3 Ad. & El. 17I
(Eng. 1835) ; Odeneal v. Henry, 70 Miss. 172 (1892). Indeed, many courts
hold that the master need not even know of the cause, at the time of dis-
charge. Allen v. Aylesworth, 58 N. J. Eq. 349 (1899); Arkush v. Hanan, 6o
Hun. 518 (N. Y. 1881). The burden of showing that there was a good cause
is on the master. Morris v. Taliaferro, 44 Ill. App. 359 (1892) ; Eubanks v.
Alspaugh, 139 N. C. 520 (19o). Whether the cause alleged is sufficient is
generally left to the jury, as in the principal case. Silk Co. v. Porter, 94 Ill.
App. 6og (iqoo); Conklin v. The Institute, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 638 (Igoo).
But if the facts are undisputed, it is for the court to decide. Peniston v.
Huber, 196 Pa. 58o (igoo). And some courts hold that it is always a matter
for the court. McIntyre v. Hockin, 16 Ont. App. 498 (Can. 1889); Hendrick-
son v. Anderson, 5o N. C. 246 (1858).
PARTNERSHIP--PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY SOLD IN BULK-NOTICE TO INDI-
",'IDUAL CREDITORS-One partner sold the entire stock in trade to his co-partner,
,o notice having been given to the separate creditors of the selling partner.
,Ield: No notice was necessary when the purchasing partner consumed prac-
tically the whole fund in paying partnership creditors. Gilbert v. Ashby,
i81 S. W. 321 (Tenn. 1916).
A sale of goods out of the ordinary course of business is considered as
fraudulent against the creditors of the vendor. Hart v. Dean, 93 Md. 432
(19Ol). This principle has been incorporated in the "sales in bulk" statutes,
some of which have made the sale of an entire stock of merchandise pre-
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sumptively fraudulent, unless the creditors are duly notified. Fisher v. Herr-
mann, 118 Wis. 428 (19o3) ; Schumacher-Binzley Co. v. Riddle, 52 Pa. Super.
Ct. 6 (1912); while others have made the presumption of fraud conclusive.
Jaques Co. v. Warehouse Co., 131 Ga. 1 (19o8); Pennell v. Robinson, 164
N. C. 257 (1913). But the failure to give notice to one creditor does not
make the sale of stock fraudulent as to the creditors who received proper
notice. Ritter v. Wray, 45 Pa. Super. Ct. 44o (igi1). And trade fixtures are
not generally included within the meaning of "goods in bulk." Lee v. Gillen
and Boney, 134 N. W. 278 (Neb. 1c12). As regards partnership property, an
individual creditor may secure a levy on firm assets, but the firm creditors
take precedence over the attachment of an individual creditor. Lewis v.'
Crane, 50 W. Va. 239 (19O); Lovins.v. Laub, i47 N. Y. S. 3o4 (1914). So it
has been held that the "sales in bulk" acts do not apply to sales of stock by a
partner to a co-partner, at least where the property is exhausted in satisfying
firm creditors. Yancey v. Lamar-Rankin Drug Co., 14o Ga. 359 (1913) ; Fair-
field Shoe Co. v. Olds, 96 N. E. 592 (Ind. 1911). Where a merchant sold part
of the stock for the purpose of taking the vendee into the partnership, the
statute was held to apply. Daly v. Drug Co., 155 S. W. 167 (Tenn. 1913).
And where thfe sale in bulk is made by the firm it is necessary to give notice
to the individual creditors of the members of the firm. Bank v. Van Allsburg,
165 Mich. 524 (1911); Mahoney-Jones Co. v. Sams Bros., 159 S. W. 1O94
(Tenn. 1913). Contra, Whitehouse v. Nelson, 43 Wash. 174 (19o6).
PLEADINc-AMENDMENT-A declaration was amended after the Statute
of Limitations had run to show that notice of injury had been given to a
municipality as required by law. Held: The Statute of Limitations was no
bar to the suit. Enberg v. Chicago, III N. E. 114 (Ill. 1916).
The general doctrine is that when an amendment introduces a new
cause of action it does not relate back to the origin of the pleadings so as to
bar the operation of the Statute of Limitations. Schuck v. Bramble, 122
Md. 411 (1914); Mumma v. Mumma, 246 Pa. 407 (1914). But if the amend-
ment merely amplifies the original pleading it relates back to the commence-
ment of the suit and the statute is arrested at that point. Southern R. Co. v.
Horine, 121 Ga. 386 (i9o4) ; Herbstritt v. Lumber Co., 212 Pa. 495 (1905).
Permission to amend is given or withheld at the discretion of the court.
Phila. v. Hestonville R. Co., 203 Pa. 38 (i9o2). As a result the decision
in a particular case will in large measure depend on the authorities in the
jurisdiction. Grier v. Northern Assurance Co., 183 Pa. 334 (898). Yet
certain principles are recognized, and the question is always decided on the
basis of the pleadings themselves. Kansas City v. Hart, 6o Kan. 684 (i8g9).
The following tests are usually applied: Will the same evidence support both
the original declaration and the amendment? Wabash R. Co. v. Bhymer,
214 Ill. 579 (9o5). Will the same measure of damages cover both? Mid-
land R. Co. v. Cardwell, 67 S. W. 157 (Tex. 19Ol). Will a judgment against
one pleading be a bar to the other? Van Patten v. Waugh, 122 Ia. 302
(19o4). Because the tests are not uniformly applied, contrary decisions
arise. Some courts will not allow a change from one contract action to
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another. Whalen v. Gordon, 37 C. C. A. 70 (1899); Nelson v. Bank, I39
Ala. 578 (19o4); while some states allow a change. from contract to tort
after the statute has run. Rand v. Webber, 64 Me. 191 (1874). See also
Verdery v. Barrett, 89 Ga. 349 (1892). Pennsylvania applies the strict rule
but allows an amendment alleging additional damages. Mining Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., 237 Pa. 42o (r912). Some courts, contrary to the principal
case, will not allow an amendment alleging the notice requisite to recovery.
Higman v. Quindaro, 91 Kan. 673 (914) ; Barnett v. Cain, 51 Pa. Super. Ct.,
642 (1912). Contra, Miller v. Erie R. Co., iog N. Y. App. 612 (I9O5). An
amendment praying for different relief is sometimes held not to be affected
by the statute. Kent v. Union, 130 Cal. 401 (igoo); Truman v. Lester, 71
N. Y. App. 612 (19o2). But an amendment cannot be allowed to change the
capacity in which a party is sued after the limitations have run. Tonge v.
Publishing Co., 244 Pa. 417 (1914). When the declaration is demurrable
only the defect may be remedied after the statutory period. Salmon v. Libby,
219 Ill. 421 (I9o6). When an essential averment is lacking most courts do
not allow amendment. Klawiter v. Jones, 219 Ill. 626 (I96); Bender v.
Penfield, 235 Pa. 58 (1912). Contra, Pullen v. Hutchinson, 25 Me. 249
(1845) ; Woodcock v. Bostic, 128 N. C. 243 (191o).
SALEs-TITLE TO STANDING TIMBER-REv asIoN-All the timber standing
on a tract of land was granted by a deed which made no provision as to the
time of removal. Held: The deed conveyed a fee simple to the timber and
removal within a reasonable time was not necessary. Chapman v. Dearman,
181 S. W. 88 (Tex. igi6).
A small minority of courts hold that a sale of standing timber is an
executory contract for the sale of chattels. Fletcher v. Livingston, 153 Mass.
388 (i89I); Whittington v. Hall, II6 Md. 467 (1911). Other courts, as in
the principal case, hold that there is a grant in fee simple. Midyette v.
Grubbs, 58 S. E. 795 (N. C. 1907). Most courts hold that there is a sale of
an interest in land, or that an easement is created whereby the vendee may
enter and remove the timber granted. Land Co. v. Parker, 59 So. 959 (Fla.
1912); McNeil v. Hall, 181 N. Y. 549 (1907). The manner of regarding
standing timber depends entirely on the intention of the parties as expressed
by the contract. McClintock's Appeal, 71 Pa. 365 (1872). At all events, the
contract conveys a present interest and it is not merely an executory agree-
ment. Wilson v. Scarboro, 163 N. C. 380 (1913); Nutting v. Stratton, 77
N. H. 79 (913).
Where the time for removal is fixed in the contract, failure to remove
within the time specified causes a reversion of the title to the grantor in most
jurisdictions. Prentis v. Ross's Estate, 96 Mich. 83 (1893) ; Bennett v. Lum-
ber Co., 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 495 (19o5); even where the deed conveys a fee.
Williams v. Parsons, 167 N. C. 529 (1914). A few cases hold that the title
remains in the vendee, but that the right to enter and remove is lost. Hal-
stead v. Jessup, i5o Ind. 85 (1898) ; Irons v. Webb, 41 N. J. L. 203 (1879).
The weight of authority is that mere cutting does not prevent title from
reverting. Bond v, Ungerecht, 1-9 Tenn. 631 (1914). Where the seller has
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-prevented the removal of part of the timber within the time specified the
purchaser should be allowed a reasonable time thereafter. Jackson v. Hardin,
87 S. W. 1119 (Ky. 19o5). Otherwise, the vendee may be restrained from
cutting by injufiction. Luffburrow v. Everett, 113 Ga. lO54 (igol); and
the vendor may sell to a second purchaser. Chestnut v. Green, 12o Ky. 385
(i9o5). Where no time has been specified for removal the general rule
is that a reasonable time is allowed for removal, after which title reverts
to the grantor. Kidder v. Flanders, 73 N. H. 345 (19o5); Patterson v.
Graham, 164 Pa. 234 (1894). The sale may be regarded as absolute, and
failure to remove would be a breach of covenant. Ore Co. v. Lumber Co.,,
lO4 Ala. 465 (1894). A. few cases are in accord with the principal case
and do not require removal within a reasonable time. Lumber Co. v. Brit-
ton, 62 So. 648 (Miss. 1913). See also Boults v. Mitchell, I Pa. 371 (1850).
TORTs-DEPRvATION OF MEANS OF SUPPORT-INTOXICATING LIQUORs-A
married woman and her minor children may maintain an action for loss of
means of support against all those who have furnished intoxicating liquors
to the husband and father, which occasioned or contributed to the damages.
Whipple v. Rosenstock, 155 N. W. 898 (Neb. 1915).
The right of action of a wife against a liquor dealer and his bondsman
for injury to her means of support caused by the sale of intoxicants to her
husband arises entirely under the civil damage laws of the various states
and is unknown at common law. Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 68 W. Va. 197
(igio). The wife has an interest in her husband's capacity to perform labor
as a means of support, and if his intoxication results in injuries, or so im-
pairs his mental or physical powers as to incapacitate him for work she
sustains an actionable injury. Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio St. 98 (1871).
Or if the husband, without being incapacitated for labor, falls into idle and
dissolute habits, Jockers v.'Borgman, 29 Kan. Iog (1883); or flees to parts
unknown, leaving the wife destitute, she can recover from the saloonkeeper
who caused his intoxication, Waxmuth v. McDonald, 96 Ill. App. 242 (igoi).
If his earning capacity is taken away by his being imprisoned for a crime
committed while drunk, a child dependent upon him for support may bring an
action. Loftus v. Hamilton, IO5 Ill. App. 72 (1902). But see Bradford v.
Boley, 167 Pa. 5o6 (1895).
The license of the saloonkeeper is not a bar to a recovery by a party
so injured in means of support. Carrier v. Bernstine, 1O4 Ia. 572 (1898).
The saloonkeeper cannot escape liability because he could not reasonably
have foreseen the consequences. Parsons v. Smith, 164 III. App. 5o9 (I91I).
That the wife may have means of her own, or an inorme from other than
her husband, does not affect her right to damages. Deel v. Heiligenstein,
244 Ill. 239 (igo). Nor is it material that the husband failed to furnish the
wife support. Knott v. Peterson, 125 Ia. 4o4 (19o4). Death caused by the
intoxication is clearly an injury to the means of support, Nelson v. State,
32 Ind. App. 88 (i9o3); and in such action it is unnecessary to show that
the saloonkeeper knew the decedent was in the habit of getting intoxicated,
Bennett v. Miller's Est., i6o Mich. 309 (191o). Notice forbidding the sale
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of intoxicants to an habitual drunkard is required by many statutes. Keyser
v. Damron, 159 Ky. 444 (I94); Bower v. Fredericks, 46 Pa. Super. 540
('9"1).
TRUSTS-RIGHT TO PROCEEDS OF NOTES SENT FOR COLLECTION-A bank
sent certain notes to another bank for collection with instructions that the
moneys collected be remitted on the day received. Contrary to these in-
structions the second bank deposited the money to the credit of the first
bank, and without its knowledge used the money in the conduct of its own
business. On the failure of the second bank, the receiver collected certain
other sums due to the bank. Held: The first bank was merely a general
creditor. Citizens' Nat. Bank of Danville v. Haynes, 187 Ga. 399 (I916).
The rule is that where a bank sends a note to another bank for collec-
tion and remittance, a trust relation is established between them qua the
moneys collected. Harrison v. Coquillard, 26 Ill. App. 513 (1887) ; Bank v.
Weems, 69 Tex. 489 (1888). Nor does the right of the first bank to follow
the trust money cease when the second bank mingles the money with the
mass of its other funds. Bank v. Weems, supra.
Formerly the equitable right of the c. q. t. to follow and recover
property misapplied by the trustee, vested upon his ability to identify it.
The right was later extended so as to attach to the proceeds of the trust
property also. Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 575 (Eng. 1815); Knatchbull v.
Hallett, L. R. 13, Chancery Div. 696 (Eng. 1888). But when the trust fund
has been dissipated and can be traced no further than into the hands of
the trustee, it is lost, and the c. q. t. stands upon no better footing than a
general creditor. Bank v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. 693 (1889); Nonotuck Silk
Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237 (1894). A number of the courts, however,
have allowed the c. q. t. a preference over the general creditors even where
it has become impossible to trace the money into any particular form. First
Nat. Bank v. Sanford, 62 Mo. App. 394 (i895); Germania Fire Ins. Co. v.
Kimble, 66 Mo. App. 370 (1896). The latter rule is the modem doctrine of
equity and proceeds upon the theory of the enrichment of the estate out
of which the priority is sought to be secured. The former view, however,
has to support it the great weight of authority.
TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs-Where the donor of a trust provides
that the income shall not be alienated in advance nor attached by the
creditors of the cestui que trust a valid spendthrift trust is created and the
creditor of the cestui que trust cannot reach the funds. Boston Trust Co. v.
Collier, iii N. E. 163 (Mass. 1916).
Since it is a well-settled rule that the incidents of a legal title attach to
an absolute equitable interest, the English courts have held that restraints
upon the attachment of the income of trust property are invalid because
they are inconsistent with the absolute right to the income. Branden v.
Robinson, 3 Ves. 324 (Eng. 1797) ; Trappes v. Meredith, 39 L. J. Chan. 366
Eng. (1870); and this view has been approved and applied in many deci-
sions in the United Stites. Tillingast v. Bradford, 5 R. 1. 205 (1858) ; Jones
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v. Reese, 65 Ala. 134 (i88o). Under this view the only way to exclude cred-
itors is to-stipulate that if the cestui que trust becomes insolvent or bankrupt
his interest will be determined and will go to some other person. For in this
case the equitable fee that vests in the cestui que trust is not an absolute one
but only conditional. Nichols v. Levy, 5 Wall. 44i (U. S. i866); Dommat
v. Bedford, 3 Ves. Jr. 149 (Eng. 1797). The increasing weight of authority
in the United States favors the rule that provisions against alienation of an
incorhie to which a beneficiary is absolutely entitled are not inconsistent with
any estate granted to him and are not against the policy of the law, and
therefore, as in the principal case, are valid. In re Seegworth's Estate, 226
Pa. 59i (i9IO) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434 (io5) ; Shelton v. King, 229
U. S. 9o (913). The provisions exempting the funds from the claims of the
creditors need not be expressed but may be implied from the terms of the
trust. Stanbaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585 (i8go). But a spendthrift trust can-
not be created by a person for his own benefit, either directly or indirectly,
so as to exempt the trust funds from payment of his debts. Menken Co. v.
Brinkly, 94 Tenn. 721 (I8q.4) ; Mackasor's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330 (1862). More-
over in order to have a spendthrift trust the income alone must be given to
the cestui que trust, for the whole American doctrine rests upon the ground
that a right to receive the income of a trust fund is not necessarily an interest
in the fund itself. Kessner v. Phillips, I89 Mo. 515 (i9o5). In some states
statutes provide for such restraints. Blankburn v. Webb, 133 Cal. 42o (i9ot) ;
North Dak. Code (i9o5) 4834; North Car. Code (xgo5) I588. The New
York code provides that a person beneficially interested in the income of
property held in trust cannot assign his right to future income unless the
trust instrument provides that he shall have that right. N. Y. Real Prop.
Laws (Igog) io3; Stringer v. Barker, rio N. Y. App. 37 (9O5).
WILLs-CNsTRUCTION-JOINT TENANCY AND TENANCY IN COMMON-A
testator directed trustees to sell his leasehold property and pay the pro-
ceeds to his nephews and nieces. Children of members of the class dying
were to be paid "a parent's share." Held: There was a joint tenancy among
the children of a nephew dying. Re Clarkson, 113 L. T. 917 (Eng. i16).
At the common law a devise to two or more persons made the devisees
joint tenants. Barnes v. Allen, i B. C. C. iSi (Eng. 1782) ; Bustard v.
Saunders, % Bea. 92 (Eng. 1843). Under the second branch of the rule in
Wild's Case, 6 Co. Rep. i6b (Eng. I599), a devise to, one and his children
carries a joint tenancy when the person named has children living at the
time of the devise. Moore v. Gary, 149 Ind. 51 (897) ; Noble v. Teeple, 58
Kan. 398 (897). But a conviction that tenancy in common is better adapted
than joint tenancy to answer the exigencies of families led the later judges
to give effect to the slightest expressions in favor of tenancy in common.
Bill v. Payne, 62 Conn. 140 (1892); Jolliffe v. East, 3 Br. C. C. 25 (Eng.
1789). Language that indicates an intention to divide the property is held
to abrogate the idea of a joint tenancy, and to create a tenancy in common.
Robertson v. Fraser, L. R. 6 Ch. 696 (Eng. 187). So. a devise or bequest
to several persons in specified unequal shares, Candle v. Candle, 74 S. E. 631
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(N. C. i912), or "share and share alike," Humason v. Andrews, 72 Conn.
595 (19oo), or "to be equally divided," whether among a class, Potter v.
Nixon, 82 N. J. Eq. 661 (1914) ; Hazard v. Stevens; 88 Atl. 98o (R. .I914),
or among persons named, Blaine v. Dew, iI Me. 48o (1914), now creates
a tenancy in common, even when "jointly" is used. Houghton v. Branting-
ham, 86 Conn. 630 (1913).
In most of the American states statutes have been enacted requiring the
testator wishing to create a joint tenancy, to use words clearly showing such
intention. Stimson American Statute Law, Sec. 1371. Under such statutes
a devise or bequest to named children, Wittel v. Wittel, 82 N. J. Eq. 229
(194), to named heirs, in re Tamargo, 155 N. Y. S. 845 (ii6), or to a
"son and his children," Moore v. Ennis, 87 Atl. ioog (Del. Ch. 1913)
creates a tenancy in common. In construing a will the court will take into
consideration the fact that it was drawn by a layman, it re Haddock's Will,
155 N. Y. S. 630 (1916), and the use by him of the word "jointly" does
not rebut the presumption established by the statute. Overheiser v. Lackey,
207 N. Y. 229 (1913). For a complete discussion of this subject, see 64
UNIV. OF PENNA. L. REv. 394.
WILLs-GIFT FOR ILLEGAL PURPOsE-A testator left his residuary estate
upon trust for a "limited company," the object of which was to promote
"the principle that human conduct should be based upon natural knowledge
and not upon supernatural belief." Held: The bequest was not for purposes
illegal or contrary to public policy. Re Bowman, 113 L. T. 1095 (Eng. 1916).
Where the object of a testamentary gift is to carry into effect some
illegal purpose that the law regards as subversive of sound public policy or
good morals, the devise or bequest is void. Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539
(Mass. 1867) ; DeCamp v. Dobbins, 31 N. J. Eq. 611 (1879). A trust for the
erection of a hall for religious discussion under the administration of a
society of infidels will not be upheld. Zeiweiss v. James, 63 Pa. 465 (187o).
A direction that property shall not be used for a certain time, Brown v.
Burdett, 21 Ch. D. 667 (Eng. 1882), or that a business be carried on for a
period without giving anyone the benefit of the profits, is nugatory. Re
Cameron, 26 Ch. D. ig (Eng. 1884). A condition tending to separation or
divorce between husband and wife is void. Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78
(1875). As to the validity of a testamentary disposition in restraint of
marriage, see the note to Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93 (19o5) in 5 Ann.
Cas. 138. A condition in a will divesting the interest of a devisee or legatee
in the event of his entering the naval or military service is void. In re
Beard [19o8] i Ch. 383 (Eng.)
A condition attached to a devise or bequest requiring the recipient to
attend religious worship, in re Paulson, 127 Wis. 612 (i9o6) or, to renounce,
Barnum v. Baltimore, 62 Ind. 275 (1884), or embrace a particular religious
belief is not against public policy. Clavering v. Ellison, 7 H. L. Cas. 707
(Eng. 1859) ; Magee v. O'Neill, I9 S. Car. 170 (882). Conditions providing
against marriage contrary to a particular religious form, or against marrying
a person of particular religious belief, have been held to be valid. Haughton
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v. Haughton, i Molloy 611 (Eng. 1824) ; in re Knox, 23 L. R. Ir. 542 (889).
A bequest to be used in advocating a constitutional amendment pro-
viding for woman suffrage does not violate the policy of the law, Garrison
v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402 (1898), nor does a provision forfeiting the devise
or legacy of any beneficiary that contests the will. Estate of Hite, 155 Cal.
436 (igog); Chew's Appeal, 45 Pa. 228 (1863).
WILLS-PRECAORY AND MANDATORY WORDS-A testator gave his real
and personal property to his wife, "she to have full control for and during
her natural life." He then "desired" certain disposition of his property to
be made after his wife's death. His wife died before him. Held: There
was no intestacy; the word "desire" was mandatory. Keplinger v. Keplinger,
iio N. E. 698 (Ind. 1915).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of
wills; and if the intent can be clearly ascertained and is not contrary to
some positive rule of law, it must prevail. Finlay v. King, 3 Pet. 346 (U. S.
183o). A request will be held mandatory if made use of in a direct devise.
Taylor v. Martin, 6 Sad. 125 (Pa. 1887). But a request will not be held
mandatory where, having made a disposition the testator expresses a mere
desire that the donee should make a certain use of his bounty. Floyd v.
Smith, 59 Fla. 485 (igo); in re Stinson's Estate, 232 Pa. 218 (I9II). A
will should be construed to give effect to all the words therein, without re-
jecting any of them, provided this can be done by a reasonable construc-
tion not inconsistent with the manifest intention of the testator. John v.
Brown, 201 Fed. 224 (1912); Mersman v. Mersman, 136 Mo. 244 (1896).
Where a word is used in one sense in one part of the will it is presumed
that the same meaning was intended in other parts, unless there is something
to indicate that a different meaning was intended. Blaine v. Dow, iii Me.
48o (,9,4). The word "desire," as ordinarily used, is mandatory rather
than precatory. Moseley v. Bolster, 201 Mass. 135 (i9o9). Presbyterian
Board v. Culp, 151 Pa. 467 (1892).
WORDS AND PHRASEs-"TENT "-The defendant constructed a moving
picture theatre 97 feet long, 58 feet wide and 3o feet high along the center,
using telegraph poles joined by a wire cable. The theatre was electrically
lighted, contained booths of glass and wood, and was capable of seating 64o
persons. The defendant claimed exemption from the ordinance of the city
regulating "buildings" on the ground that the structure described was a
"tent." Held: The theatre was a "building." City of St. Louis v. Nash, 181
S. W. 1145 (1916).
Whether a certain structure is or is not a "building" is often a question
of great importance. Blakemore v. Stanley, 159 Mass. 6 (i893); the subtle
line that distinguishes a chicken coop from a chicken house may mark the
difference between larceny and burglary, or between murder in the second
degree and murder in the first degree. Williams v. State, 1O5 Ga. 814 (1898) ;
People v. Steckman, 34 Cal. 242 (1861). Under the dictionary definition of
"building" as "that which is built" the courts seem at liberty to include any-
thing erected by man. A "wall" has, however, been held not to be a build-
ing. Nowell v. Academy of Notre Dame, 130 Mass. 209 (I881).
